In recent years, wireless sensor networks have been adopted in various areas of daily life, and this exposes the network data and hardware to a number of security threats. Many key management schemes have been proposed to secure the communications among nodes, for instance the popular LEAP+ protocol. This paper proposes an enhanced variant of the LEAP+ protocol that decreases the key setup time through the reduction of the number of packets exchanged. This improves the security of communications. The results obtained by network simulation after extensive testing are compared to the corresponding data derived from the LEAP+ protocol to quantify the improvements.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have obtained worldwide attention in recent years due to the diffusion of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems technology which has led to the manufacture of smart sensors. These sensors are smaller and more affordable than the older generation sensors and can measure and collect information from the environment, transmit this data through wireless communication links and process them in order to take decisions. However, these sensor nodes have limited computing resources and can only perform complex tasks in large regions if organized in an interlinked network.
Nowadays this pervasive technology is exploited in various applications ranging from infrastructure monitoring [1] to HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) for buildings [2] . WSNs have also been applied to military purposes [3] due to the low costs and high scalability. In each of these contexts communications security is crucial. In particular, WSNs must be protected from threats that could compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the data or alter the behavior of the nodes. Since WSNs are often deployed in unsafe or hostile areas they are exposed to various security threats like eavesdropping, hardware tampering or injection of malicious requests. Therefore, in order to protect the integrity, confidentiality and reliability of WSNs an effective security scheme is required.
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Overview of LEAP+ protocol
The LEAP+ protocol is based on a transitory master key technique and on the assumption that a newly deployed node cannot be compromised within a short period of time (denoted by T M IN ). This is the time required for neighbor discovery and pairwise key negotiation. Therefore, T M IN represents the maximum amount of time available to an attacker to access and copy the memory of a sensor node. The security scheme presented in [9] proposes the adoption of four kinds of key to manage different levels of communication among the nodes (including the Base Station). This work is focused on the pairwise key negotiation which is the most crucial security aspect of the LEAP+ protocol. In order to increase the security level, the pairwise keys of each pair of nodes are negotiated after the deployment, exploiting the transitory master key secrecy. In this way each pair of nodes will have a different shared secret and the compromise of one pairwise key will not affect the security of the other links of the network.
The pairwise key negotiation procedure is composed of 4 phases, as shown in Fig. 1 , where:
-a −→ * : node a broadcasts a packet; -a −→ b : node a unicasts a packet to node b; -{m} K : message m cyphered with key K; -M AC(m) K : Message Authentication Code of the message m indexed by the key K; -a|b|c : concatenation of a, b, c.
Before the deployment of the network an offline setup procedure (Phase 0 ) is carried out. During this phase the central controller generates and loads the same transitory master key on each node of the network. From the transitory master key each node derives its own private master key K u = f K IN (u), where f (·) is a pseudo-random function indexed by the key K IN . At the time of deployment each node starts a timer which measures the lifetime of the master key. When the timer elapses the master key is deleted from the memory. In this way the node will no longer be able to start a handshake procedure for the negotiation of a pairwise key since it is no longer capable of verifying the authenticity of the ACK1 answer. However a node which is no longer in possession of the master key can still answer to any HELLO message received from other nodes. Therefore, this mechanism allows the addition of new nodes to a network that has already completed the deployment phase.
After key initialization the nodes are ready for deployment. When a node is activated and deployed it starts to exchange messages with its neighbors to negotiate the pairwise keys. In order to start the handshake, a generic node u periodically broadcasts a packet called HELLO. This packet contains the identification code ID u of the sender. Through this packet the node communicates its presence to the neighbors (Phase 1 ). The frequency of the HELLO packets (1/T HELLO ) has great impact on the performance of the handshake. In fact, the transmission of a high number of messages increases the probability that 4 Cesare Celozzi, Filippo Gandino, Maurizio Rebaudengo Phase 0, Key initialization Phase 1, Send HELLO: u −→ * : IDu every neighbor will receive the HELLO message but also increases the number of collisions on the wireless channel. Therefore, sending HELLO packets with high frequency degrades the overall performance of the system. The choice of a proper T HELLO must be made taking into account the average node degree of the network. A generic node v which receives the HELLO message will reply with an acknowledgment message ACK1 (Phase 2 ). This message is unicast to the sender of the HELLO message and contains the ID v and a MAC indexed by the private master key K v . In order to avoid collisions the ACK1 packets are sent after the backoff time which is a random time extracted from a uniform distribution with range (0, T BACKOF F ). At the same time the node starts a timer that will elapse after an interval of time during which the node waits for an answers (ACK2) from the HELLO sender (node u). If the node does not receive the ACK2 message after the timer elapses, it retransmits the ACK1 message. This retransmission is scheduled in the interval of time (T BACKOF F +1s, 2·T BACKOF F +1s).
When the node u receives back the ACK1 message it verifies the integrity and authenticity of the message computing the MAC and comparing it to the one attached to the received message. In positive cases it generates and stores the pairwise key and sends a response called ACK2 (Phase 3 ). The ACK2 contains the ID u of the HELLO sender and the MAC for authentication. When the node v receives the ACK2 and verifies the integrity and authenticity of the message the handshake is completed and both nodes share the same pairwise key for further secure communications.
Security issue
From a security point of view the main weak point of LEAP+ protocol is that the compromise of the transitory master key during the deployment phase may disrupt the security of the whole network. In fact, an attacker in possession of the master key may decipher eavesdropped traffic and even fabricate new nodes able to initiate the handshake for pairwise key negotiation. The threshold T M IN represents the interval of time during which it can be assumed that it is not physically possible to compromise the memory of a node. However, the experiment realized in 2005 by [10] showed that it is possible to obtain a copy of the memory of a node in tens of seconds. This study also showed that the key setup time may last minutes depending on the average node degree and on the number of messages exchanged. Since T M IN must not be longer than the time estimated by [10] (which future technologies will lower), the reduction of T M IN is a critical aspect for ensuring the security of the key management scheme. This work focuses on this security issue and proposes a variation of the LEAP+ that dramatically lowers the value of T M IN required by LEAP+ for networks with same average node degree.
Proposed approach
From the analysis presented in the previous section it can be noticed that in specific cases, especially those with high average node degree, the LEAP+ protocol does not allow the negotiation of all the keys actually available in the system because T M IN is too short. The major cause of this behavior is the high number of collisions generated by the large quantity of messages exchanged in a small time interval during the negotiation phase. A possible solution for this problem is the adoption of T M IN intervals with longer duration. However, this solution increases the probability of compromising a node that is still in possession of the master key, thus allowing an attacker to break all network communications. Conversely, the violation of a node which is in possession of the sole private master key only allows the violation of the communications that involve the compromised node. Therefore, to increase the security of the network the time interval T M IN should be minimized. To achieve this goal the handshake (HELLO−→ACK1−→ACK2) should be as efficient as possible to maximize the number of keys negotiated during the T M IN interval. In fact, if a node is not able to negotiate a pairwise key with a neighbor node, it cannot communicate directly with it and this may imply an increase of energy consumption deriving from the resulting use of multi-hop communication.
Starting from the solutions adopted by LEAP+ a new handshake has been proposed to reduce the number of packets exchanged and the duration of the key negotiation phase.
Hello flag
As discussed above, the pairwise key negotiation of the LEAP+ protocol [9] is composed of various phases ( Fig. 1 ) but starts with the HELLO message broadcast. The HELLO message is sent periodically during the time interval
When the nodes of the network are activated, a large amount of traffic due to the broadcast of the HELLO messages and to the subsequent ACKs is generated. For instance, in a network with n = 50 nodes, T M IN = 30s and T HELLO = 3s, the protocol generates n · (T M IN /T HELLO ) = 500 HELLO packets. For each HELLO message each node answers with an ACK1 message which is received by all other nodes that are in the communication range. The communication modules of the receiving nodes must perform the basic operations to identify if they are recipients of the ACK1 message, regardless of whether the communication is unicast or broadcast. This may be exploited to reduce the number of HELLO messages in the network by simply interpreting a generic ACK1 message with a destination address that is different from the receiver address as a HELLO message. A HELLO flag was added to the header of the ACK1 packet in order to enable or disable this feature. The HELLO flag is necessary when a node is no longer in possession of the master key. In this case the node is not able to initiate a handshake procedure since it cannot verify the authenticity of the ACK1 replies. Therefore, the HELLO flag must be set to f alse. Since the simulation experiments have shown that the variation of the quantity and frequency of the HELLO messages have a significant impact on performance in terms of time required for the negotiation of the keys, a period T HELLO = 0.33·T M IN was also applied to the ACK1 messages that have the HELLO flag set to true.
When a node is deployed and the LEAP+ protocol starts the handshake, a HELLO message is scheduled in the interval of time 0÷T HELLO . If the node receives a HELLO message from another node before sending its own HELLO message it answers with an ACK1 message in which the HELLO flag is set to true. The HELLO message which has been replaced by the ACK1 with the HELLO flag set to true is rescheduled by a time equal to T HELLO . Furthermore, a proximity threshold was introduced to discard and replace a HELLO message, which was scheduled for an instant of time that falls within the threshold, with an ACK1 message. This threshold makes it possible to anticipate the beginning of the handshake through the dispatch of an ACK1 message that must be sent in any case. The implementation of this mechanism requires the capability to disable the incoming packets filter which discard packets that are not meant for the node. In the experimental phase a proximity threshold of 0.1·T HELLO was adopted. Tests showed that this mechanism reduces the number of HELLO message produced by the protocol.
Composite ACK1
The security of LEAP+ protocol is based on the assumption that only the possessors of the master key can authenticate the ACK1 through the computation of M AC(ID u |ID v ) Kv . The presence of ID u in the MAC argument is critical from the security point of view because it prevents potential reply attacks. Since each node performs this computation for each HELLO message received, the number of packets in the network during the handshake and the power consumption depend on the node degree distribution of the network. In networks with high average node degree the performance of the handshake may suffer from a high number of collisions and from resulting retransmissions.
Starting from these considerations a new typology of ACK1 packet called composite ACK1 (ACK1 C for brevity) was proposed. The ACK1 C packet is a special ACK1 packet that contains the ID u of every node from which the sender received a HELLO message, with the corresponding MAC. The ACK1 C ensures the same security features of the ACK1 packet but is able to manage all the pending handshake initiation requests with a single message. Only a node in possession of the master key can generate the ACK1 C message and the recipients can verify the authenticity of such a packet through the same mechanisms adopted for the ACK1 message. Each ACK1 C packet can carry a maximum number S of node IDs for which S slots are reserved ID u1 . . . ID u S |ID v . In this way the maximum dimension of the packet is constant.
The adoption of the ACK1 C packet reduces the total number of messages required for key negotiation. Theoretically, the reduction of ACK1 messages is equal to 1/S. This reduction also lowers the workload and the memory occupation required for the generation of the corresponding MAC. On the other hand, there is a limited increase in the size of the message which does not significantly affect the processing time for the computation of the MAC. The ACK1 C packets are broadcast in the network as a response to multiple HELLO message received by a node. Each node that receives an ACK1 C packet verifies whether its own ID u is contained in one of the slots of the packet and decides to drop it or further develop the handshake protocol. If the HELLO flag is set to true and if the receivers have not yet exchanged a pairwise key with the sender, the ACK1 C packet is interpreted as a HELLO message. Otherwise the receiver verifies the authenticity of the message and continues the handshake described in the LEAP+ protocol.
When a node receive a HELLO message or an ACK1 C with the HELLO flag set to true and no ACK1 C is in the outgoing queue, it schedules a new ACK1 C packet and randomly chooses a backoff time from the interval 0÷T BACKOF F . If the node receives further HELLOs from other nodes it adds new ID u in the free slots of the scheduled ACK1 C packet until there are no more free slots or the backoff timer elapse. After sending the message, for each node whose ID u has been added to the ACK1 C packet the node awaits the ACK2 replies for a certain amount of time. If some of the replies are missing, the free slots of the next ACK1 C scheduled in the outgoing queue are filled with the ID u of the nodes associated to the missing replies and with the ID u of the HELLOs received in the meanwhile. In order to maximize the number of useful slots of the scheduled ACK1 C , the IDs of the nodes with missing ACK2 replies near to the expiration threshold are also added in the free slots of the ACK1 C message.
Modified handshake protocol
Since ACK1 C packets have the same security features of ACK2 packets but allow multiple destinations, they can replace them. This led to a new version of the handshake protocol: HELLO−→ACK1 C −→ACK1 C . With this handshake it is possible to obtain improved performance especially in case of high-density networks and short key setup time T M IN . These improvements cover the cases highlighted as critical by the security analysis presented in the previous section. In order to discriminate between ACK1 C packets that require authentication from nodes in possession of the master key and ACK1 C packets which replace ACK2 packets, an additional flag was introduced in the ACK1 C packet for each slot (ACK2 flag). This modified handshake still guarantees that the nodes that terminate the key negotiation are authorized nodes in possession of the master key.
Since one ACK2 flag is associated to each slot, both ACK1 and ACK2 acknowledgment messages can coexist in the same ACK1 C packet. Therefore, when a node receive an ACK1 C packet it verifies if its ID u is present in one of the slots and then checks the status of the corresponding ACK2 flag and of the HELLO flag in order to correctly interpret the message. In the case of ACK1 C packet interpreted as ACK2 the node generates the appropriate pairwise key and the handshake terminates. Otherwise, after the generation of the pairwise key the node dispatches an ACK2-like packet (ACK1 C with ACK2 flag or ACK2).
Summing up, there are different handshake configurations in which each node may be involved. The negotiation procedure starts with a HELLO packet or with an ACK1 C packet with the HELLO flag set to true. After the first step, the receiving nodes reply with an ACK1 C packet. Then, the handshake is terminated with an ACK2 packet in case the sender no longer has the master key. Otherwise, the handshake is terminated with an ACK1 C packet which improves the efficiency of the protocol. If a node does not receive an ACK2-like packet it must retransmit the ACK1 C packet (Fig. 2) . In Fig. 3 the possible handshake configurations are summarized. The proposed handshake requires three different packets: HELLO, ACK1 C and ACK2. These packets contain the fields shown in Tab. 1.
Comparison between LEAP+ and the proposed approach
In this session the performance of LEAP+ and of the proposed handshake have been analyzed and compared for different network configurations. The NS2 network simulation software has been adopted to collect large quantity of data. This software has been integrated with specific libraries for the analysis of Wireless Sensor Networks. The network parameters that was taken into account for the configuration of the simulator are: -Nodes: number of active nodes in the network; -Average node degree: average number of nodes in the wireless communication range of each node; -X,Y: dimension of the deployment area (X · Y m 2 with X = Y ); -T M IN : lifetime of the master key; after T M IN elapses the node erase the master key and all the keys derived from it except its own private master key; -Deploy interval: maximum time interval between the deployment and the activation of a node; -T HELLO : time interval between two consecutive HELLO messages; -T BACKOF F : maximum time interval between the reception of a HELLO message and the forwarding of the ACK1 reply. 
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Hello Flag If set to true the message can be interpreted as HELLO Fig. 4 for different values of the average node degree. It can be noticed that the adoption of the proposed handshake significantly reduces the time T M IN by a factor that depends on the network configuration and on the protocol parameters (i.e.: the number of slots in the ACK1 C packet, etc...). For the configuration shown in Tab. 2 the reduction of T M IN is greater than 30% respect to LEAP+. Data collected through the simulations showed the better scalability of the proposed approach due to the reduction of packets exchanged during the handshake. This parameter may be further reduced determining an adequate number of available slots in the ACK1 C packet, thus acting on the trade-off between the packet overhead and the performance. Furthermore, a detailed analysis on the relationship between average node degree and T M IN has been performed. From results presented in Fig. 5 it can be noticed that for low values of T M IN and high Fig. 4 . TMIN in the case of completion threshold equal to 99%. values of average node degrees the percentages of completion are lower. However, the proposed approach improves these percentages in each critical configuration (see Fig. 5 ). For instance, in the case of T M IN = 4s the completion percentage of LEAP+ original handshake is about 70% whereas the completion percentage of the proposed handshake is about 100%. From the charts shown in Fig. 5 it can be highlighted that very short T M IN intervals do not allow the negotiation of all the pairwise keys. Adopting the network parameters of Tab. 2 the LEAP+ handshake allows a completion percentage of 95% with T M IN = 6s while the proposed approach performs better, allowing the same completion percentage with T M IN = 3s.
Deployment time analysis
In order to carry out a detailed analysis of the proposed handshake for different values of the deploy interval, a network configuration with high average node degree has been adopted (Tab. 3). In fact, in networks with high average node degree the activation of a large number of neighbor nodes causes the generation of a large number of packets in a limited time interval. In this context, the high number of collisions in the communication channel dramatically increases the number of resent packets, thus stretching the negotiation time. Therefore, this condition amplifies the differences between the two handshakes and allows an effective comparison. As shown in Fig. 6 , both LEAP+ and the proposed approach present weak performance for low values of the deploy interval. However, the adoption of ACK1 C packets and of the modified handshake HELLO−→ACK1 C −→ACK1 C makes it possible to increase considerably the percentage of keys negotiated in the network, keeping the deploy interval constant. This statement is also endorsed by the study of the average number of packets received and sent by each node. In fact, the proposed handshake allows the reduction of the number of sent packet for each deploy interval, as shown in Fig. 7 . From the analysis of Fig. 7(a) it can be noticed that the high number of retransmissions is due to the loss of ACK2 packets. The number of retransmissions and collisions decreases as the deploy interval increases. However, the average number of received packets per node increases in the new implementation (see Fig. 8 ) since the ACK1 C packets introduced in the proposed handshake are broadcast and potentially received by S nodes.
It is worth noting that the quantities of packets sent and received as a function of the deploy interval, shown in the previous histograms, refer to different completion percentages (data shown in Fig. 6 ). As highlighted in Fig. 7(a) , a high number of sent packets does not necessarily implies a high number of negotiated keys. This is due to the increment in the number of collisions that occurs when the number of packets exchanged in the communication channel increases. 
Conclusion
This paper presented an enhanced version of the LEAP+ protocol which improves the security of the handshake for pairwise key negotiation. The improvement consists in the reduction of the vulnerability time during which an attacker may stole the master key that is critical for the security of all the pairwise key communications. The results, obtained through a network simulator, showed significant improvements of performance in terms of reduction of the key setup time and of number of packets exchanged for the key negotiation. The improvements were more evident in the most critical contexts for the LEAP+ protocol such as high density networks with low activation time. The higher efficiency in the pairwise key negotiation made it possible to shorten the interval of vulnerability of the nodes thus increasing the security of the entire network. The study carried out showed the importance of the selection of proper network configuration parameters and algorithms parameter. The evaluation of optimal values for these parameters as a function of specific constraints of the network will be the subject of future research.
